

Behind the Neo-Prohibition Campaign

The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation

By Dan Mindus, Senior Analyst

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America's anti-alcohol movement is composed of dozens of overlapping community groups, research institutions, and advocacy organizations, but they are brought together and given direction by one entity: the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF). Based in Princeton, New Jersey, the RWJF has spent more than \$265 million between 1997 and 2002 to tax, vilify, and restrict access to alcoholic beverages. Nearly every study disparaging alcohol in the mass media, every legislative push to limit marketing or increase taxes, and every supposedly "grass-roots" anti-alcohol movement was conceived and coordinated at the RWJF's headquarters. Thanks to this one foundation, the U.S. anti-alcohol movement speaks with one voice.

For the RWJF, it is an article of faith that diminishing per capita consumption across the board can contain the social consequences of alcohol abuse. Therefore, it has engaged in a long-term war to reduce overall drinking by all Americans. The RWJF relentlessly audits its own programs, checking to see if each dollar spent is having the maximum impact on reducing per capita consumption. Over the past 10 years, this blueprint has been refined. Increased taxes, omnipresent roadblocks, and a near total elimination of alcohol marketing are just a few of the tactics the RWJF now employs in its so-called "environmental" approach.

The environmental approach seeks to shift blame from the alcohol abuser to society in general (and to alcohol providers in particular). So the RWJF has turned providers into public enemy number one, burdening them with restrictions and taxes to make their business as difficult and complex as possible. The environmental approach's message to typical consumers, meanwhile, is that drinking is abnormal and unacceptable. The RWJF seeks to marginalize drinking by driving it underground, away from mainstream culture and public places.

The RWJF funds programs that focus on every conceivable target, at every level from local community groups to state and federal legislation. Every demographic group is targeted: women, children, the middle class, business managers, Hispanics, Blacks, Whites, Native Americans. Every legal means is used: taxation,

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First Tobacco, Now Alcohol

Anti-alcohol evangelists increasingly model their efforts on the tobacco wars. “It’s time to get the country looking at the alcohol industry in exactly the same way we’re looking at tobacco,” says Sandy Golden of the Campaign for Alcohol-Free Kids. “We’re 10 to 15 years behind the tobacco people, and we want to close the gap in the next year or two.”

“After drugs and tobacco, I think the next frontier will be—it has to be—alcohol,” then-MADD President Karolyn Nunnallee said in 1999. “We’re kind of on the coat-tails of the tobacco movement,” says the director of the Trauma Foundation’s Center on Alcohol Advertising. “It will take a while, but I think it’s kind of inevitable... This industry is profiting from the misery of others.”

A 2000 RWJF-funded conference organized by the Marin Institute recommended: “Ban all alcohol ads in print, TV, radio, magazine (as we did with tobacco).” Alcohol Policy Conference XI included a workshop entitled “Lessons from the Tobacco Control Movement.”

Like V-E day (victory over Europe in WWII) and V-J day (victory over Japan), the anti-tobacco movement had its V-T day (victory over tobacco) when the industry agreed to fork over more than \$200 billion to fund healthcare and tobacco prevention programs. That’s exactly what the RWJF-funded anti-alcohol forces yearn for—a V-A day (victory over alcohol). Their biggest policy objective is to force the alcohol industry to fund a massive, anti-alcohol advertising campaign.

Such a campaign is predicated on the belief that alcohol, like tobacco, does not improve human health. While some RWJF-funded groups complain that any acknowledgement of health benefits would send “mixed messages,” others insist (despite all evidence) that alcohol remains entirely devoid of such benefits. The Marin Institute’s home page, for example, highlights this quote from Dominique Gillot, France’s Secretary of State for Health: “There is no scientific consensus over the protective effect of alcohol.”

regulation, litigation. Every PR tactic: grassroots advocacy, paid advertising, press warfare. Every conceivable location: college campuses, sporting events, restaurants, cultural activities, inner cities, residential neighborhoods, and even bars.

The RWJF scored a major victory in 2000 with a federal .08 BAC mandate, and can claim credit for restrictions on alcohol in localities all over the country. But its \$265 million has accomplished much more: it has put in place all the elements required for more sweeping change. This includes a vast network of local community organizations, centers for technical support, a compliant press, and a growing body of academic literature critical of even moderate alcohol consumption. The next highly publicized study or angry local movement may now reach the “tipping point” where the RWJF-funded anti-alcohol agenda snowballs into the kind of orchestrated frenzy the tobacco industry knows well.

RWJF Research

Any mass political movement requires intellectual firepower. To that end, the RWJF has funded thousands of academic studies and research papers purportedly demonstrating the social problems associated with alcohol. The RWJF wants research that bolsters its efforts to reduce per capita consumption, so each study is carefully crafted as part of an overall campaign. Every paper fits neatly into the intellectual fortress (or house of cards, depending on how you see it) that the RWJF needs for its communication effort.

For example:

- One RWJF-funded study concluded that casual drinking costs American businesses \$67 billion a year. Reporting on the study, the *Wall Street Journal* wrote: “Seemingly innocuous events such as an after-work trip to the bar or a family birthday party can add up to a significant drag on productivity.” The *Christian Science Monitor* quoted the study’s authors as saying “companies don’t need to do a lot to change people’s behavior – just tell them about the negative effects of hangovers and even one glass of wine at lunch.” The study itself went even further, recommending: “A shift of the focus of worksite alcohol interventions from a model that focuses exclusively on alcoholism to one that recognizes the inherent risks of alcohol consumption at any level is suggested.”

Of course, the RWJF wanted to get as much press coverage for this study—indicting the casual drinker—as possible. So the report

was released to coincide with the RWJF-funded Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) annual New Year's drinking and driving campaign. A few days after the workplace report was released, MADD used it to berate casual drinkers in *USA Today*: "While a lot of attention is paid to the serious problems of repeat offenders, we don't want to overlook the casual drinker," said Karolyn Nunnallee, National President of Mothers Against Drunk Driving. Her organization notes that while repeat offenders pose special problems, at least 80% of drunken drivers in fatal crashes—and two-thirds of the 1 million people arrested each year for drunken driving—are not chronic, problem drinkers. That warning comes as a new study shows that casual or social drinkers—and not alcoholics—are responsible for most of the \$67 billion worth of lost workplace productivity each year that is attributed to alcohol."

- A group called the Center on Alcohol Marketing and Youth (CAMY), which was founded by—and receives half its budget from—the RWJF, exists for one purpose: to accuse the alcohol industry of "targeting" underage drinkers. Last fall, CAMY released a study complaining that youth are "overexposed" to television ads for alcoholic beverages because they watch shows like *Saturday Night Live*, *The Howard Stern Show*, *Days of Our Lives*, *A.J. After Hours*, *ER*, *The Late Show With Conan O'Brien*, and *The X-Files* in percentages that exceed their proportion of the population (never mind the real reason is that 19 year-olds simply watch a lot of TV).

The *Washington Post* quoted CAMY saying: "America's parents should be disturbed by these findings. They aren't seeing these ads but their children are because that's where the industry is putting them." In other publications, CAMY went further, claiming that "beer and liquor companies target youths" and pleading, "help us stop this advertising that's really seducing our youth to do things that they really don't want to do." Essentially, CAMY suggests that alcohol advertising is a form of mind control, which should be eliminated—except perhaps in publications like *Modern Maturity*. To bolster CAMY's work, the RWJF even conducts its own polls that supposedly demonstrate the public's opposition to alcohol ads on television.

The RWJF funds studies that inform public policy decisions, but—more importantly—help to buttress its anti-alcohol communications effort. The growing body of anti-alcohol literature commissioned by the RWJF provides fodder for nearly every possible PR need.

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Co-opting the Government

The RWJF provides supplemental funding to both the U.S. Education Department's Higher Education Center for Alcohol and Other Drug Prevention (HEC), and the Justice Department's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). Both government offices advocate the environmental approach—giving their imprimatur to the RWJF's agenda.

HEC literature supports:

A) Changing Alcohol Intentions: changing people's knowledge, attitudes, and behavioral intentions regarding alcohol use.

B) Changing alcohol environments in which alcohol is used [*sic*]. Environments include 1) group norms, 2) providing alcohol-free options, 3) reducing alcohol availability, 4) reducing alcohol promotion and marketing, and 5) enforcing alcohol policies and laws.

OJJDP literature, prepared by the RWJF-funded Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation (PIRE), says:

The general availability of alcohol in a community can affect the level of consumption ... Strategies for controlling availability include:

- An increase in price through excise taxes;
- Conditional use permits for alcohol outlets;
- Controls on outlet location and density;
- Controls on hours of sale.

OJJDP also endorses:

- Prohibitions or controls on alcohol use at community events or in public areas (e.g., at county fairs, in parks, or at beaches), which can also be seen as a control on access;
- Prohibition of alcohol sponsorship of public events (e.g., a beer company sponsoring a boat race);
- Media campaigns, media advocacy, and counter-advertising;
- Controls on alcohol advertising (especially on billboards, sides of buses, and in other public areas);

Below are conclusions from a few “studies” funded directly by the RWJF, or conducted by RWJF-funded organizations:

- “Eliminating the glut of inner-city alcohol outlets could cut the American homicide rate by 10 percent and save 2,000 lives annually.”
- “Each year, the federal government spends between \$900 million and \$1 billion on alcohol prevention services for people of all ages, less than 2 percent of the annual cost of alcohol use by youth alone.”
- “Alcohol’s impact on world health is more damaging than tobacco’s and more than five times as severe as illegal drugs.”
- “Alcohol is a factor in the three leading causes of deaths among 15-24 year olds: unintentional injuries, homicides, and suicides.”
- “Underage drinking costs Americans nearly \$53 billion annually.”
- “Drinking in hazardous amounts (more than five drinks at one occasion) accounts for 53 percent of all the alcohol consumed in the United States. Another 25 percent is consumed in at-risk amounts (three to four drinks at one occasion).”
- “More than 67% of young people who start drinking before the age of 15 will try an illicit drug. Children who drink are 7.5 times more likely to use any illicit drug, more than 22 times more likely to use marijuana, and 50 times more likely to use cocaine than children who never drank.”
- “63% of adults favor a law that would ban all advertisements of alcoholic beverages on billboards in the community.”
- “61% of adults favor a law that would ban all advertisements of beer and wine on television.”
- “Nearly 82 percent of adults favor an increase of five cents per drink in the tax on beer, wine, or liquor to pay for programs to prevent minors from drinking and to increase alcohol treatment programs.”

Shoddy Statistics

All RWJF-funded research should be considered suspect, but sometimes its bias is so obvious, and its methodology so shoddy, that mainstream newspapers and even the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reject it.

The following are a few examples of the RWJF’s most notoriously flawed numbers:

- Columbia University’s National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA), which has happily accepted more than \$33 million from the RWJF since 1991, has one of the worst records for rushing to the press with slapdash statistics. A 2002 CASA report entitled “Teen Tipplers” claimed underage drinkers account for 25 percent of alcohol consumption in the United States—implying that every American between 12 and 20 who drinks consumes over four drinks every day. A *New York Times* article, headlined “Disturbing Finding on Youth Drinkers Proves to Be Wrong,” reported that the real proportion of alcohol consumed by teenagers was less than half CASA’s figure.
- CASA recently released a second version of the “Teen Tipplers” report—just as flawed—accusing the alcohol industry of reaping the majority of its revenues from youth (19.7%) and “excessive” drinking. Even the CDC criticized this second report. According to *The New York Times*, “an official at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said the study’s authors took a C.D.C. survey of high-school drinking and ‘inappropriately’ assumed that everyone from 12 year-olds in junior high school to 20 year-old college juniors had the same drinking rate.” CASA also defined excessive drinking as more than two drinks in one day, implying that a couple who splits a bottle of wine are problem drinkers. Despite all these errors, the second CASA study led the Center for Science and the Public Interest (CSPI), another RWJF-funded neo-prohibitionist group, to proclaim: “The industry considers underage and excessive drinking to be profit centers that need nurturing, rather than problems that need solving.”
- Another CASA report called college binge drinking a problem of “epidemic proportions.” CASA’s key finding—that binge drinking among college women had tripled—made national headlines. But the CASA-of-cards came tumbling down when *Forbes MediaCritic*, a now-defunct news journal, found that CASA’s conclusions were completely unjustified. It turns out that binge drinking at college campuses had remained steady for decades. A closer look at CASA’s research standards told the rest of the story: many of the “statistics” cited by CASA were merely conjectures by health educators at various universities. One number even came from a student handout that was purportedly “not intended to reflect any kind of original research.” Another came from a misquote published in a student newspaper. *MediaCritic*

- Sobriety checkpoints for impaired drivers (especially important as a method of enforcing zero tolerance laws).

The National Traffic & Highway Safety Administration (NHTSA) works with RWJF-funded anti-alcohol forces as well. NHTSA’s Jim Wright said at Alcohol Policy conference XIII that he was working with PIRE on “best practices”; that people coming from bars account for 50 percent of drinking-and-driving fatalities; and that “it is more effective to go after the people supplying [than consumers].”

“It’s easier to control the providers than it is the consumers.”



This advertisement was produced by an organization whose program director is a RWJF fellow. It illustrates the RWJF propaganda campaign to position alcohol as a destructive, addictive, and abnormal drug.

Most people consider heroin an unimaginably horrible substance. They wouldn't dream of taking it. And there is certainly no such thing as moderate or reasonable heroin consumption. Likewise, the anti-alcohol movement's message to normal drinkers is that they have a problem—that any alcohol consumption necessarily implies a genuine crisis. The RWJF-funded Center for Science in the Public Interest wants to include alcohol in the federal government's anti-drug media campaign. "Don't forget beer," the group says, "the king of drugs."

Defenders of this beer-is-heroin advertising say kids are the intended audience. But that makes the ad even more devious. The anti-alcohol movement wants kids to believe that alcohol is a horrible drug, and that the adults in their lives—their mothers and fathers—are abusing drugs if they have wine with dinner.

The RWJF has funded programs encouraging kids to enlist their parents to sign no-alcohol pledges. Efforts to ban alcohol from public places like parks and sporting events are said to protect kids from exposure to alcohol, but what they really do is prevent children from seeing that alcohol can be consumed responsibly. Adults know that alcohol can be consumed responsibly, but kids may not. So the RWJF targets children, and uses them against their own parents.

The RWJF isn't above race and class appeals. They tell minority groups that the alcohol industry is out to get them. But they also have a subtle campaign to

concluded that CASA's numbers were outdated, "not credible," or simply "pulled from thin air."

- Boston University sociologist Ralph Hingson runs the RWJF-funded "Join Together Online" program, which serves as a clearinghouse of information for the anti-alcohol movement. He is also one of the most careless—and frequently cited—researchers around. Hingson produced a study declaring that a national .08 BAC law would save "500 to 600 lives a year." But to come up with that number, Hingson went cherry-picking, carefully selecting only certain .08 states so that the results would align with his prejudices. Perhaps the most highly respected auditor in the world, the GAO, calls Hingson's study "unfounded." Nevertheless, it is still cited by MADD and other neo-prohibitionist groups.
- In 2002, Hingson authored a headline-grabbing study that blamed alcohol for 1,400 fatalities among college students each year. Aside from stretching the definition of "alcohol-related fatality" to ridiculous lengths, Hingson did no research whatsoever with college students. Instead, he simply took statistics about alcohol-related fatalities among 18 to 24 year-olds and multiplied by their percentage of the general population. Unfortunately, this blunder didn't stop *The New York Times* from beginning its coverage by reporting: "On an average day, according to a new study, four college students die in accidents involving alcohol."

RWJF Money Behind AMA and Rand Corporation Studies

The RWJF has made a habit out of funding widely respected institutions for the production of anti-alcohol reports. With an expenditure of only a few hundred thousand dollars, the RWJF can buy a study that reflects its anti-alcohol priorities, along with the built-in credibility of the author's organization.

In a recent study funded by a \$263,711 grant from the RWJF, the Rand Corporation's Deborah Cohen wrote that the "magnitude of alcohol-related health problems in a population is directly related to per capita consumption." She thereby threw Rand's good name behind the RWJF's effort to reduce per capita drinking. Cohen recommended "controlling access to alcohol, penalties for violations of liquor laws, stricter licensure requirements, and random sobriety checkpoints." She clearly believes in the environmental approach—making it

more difficult for customers to actually buy alcoholic beverages—because, as she told *The Dallas Morning News*, “It’s easier to control the providers than it is the consumers.”

The RWJF knew exactly what it was paying for when it funded this study. Cohen’s proposal said she would “provide additional evidence supporting the population-consumption model, which states that population level consumption of alcohol determines the rate of alcohol related mortality.” And Cohen had made her biases clear as early as 1998, testifying before Congress against Louisiana’s more tolerant alcohol policies.

The RWJF cloaks its agenda in the language of public health, so perhaps its most important ally is the American Medical Association (AMA). The AMA administers two major RWJF-funded programs: “Reducing Underage Drinking Through Coalitions” and “A Matter of Degree.” Both are run by Richard Yoast, who honed his prohibitionist skills as the Director of Tobacco Control for the State of Wisconsin during the 1990s.

Last winter, Yoast authored a RWJF-funded paper about the alcohol beverage industry entitled “Partner or Foe?” A news story in the *Chicago Tribune* got it exactly right by calling Yoast’s work a “well-researched policy document.” It was well-researched, in the sense that it cited dozens of other RWJF-funded studies, and it was a *policy* brief. Yoast called for:

- “increased alcohol taxes”;
- “reducing discount drink specials”;
- “decreasing the number of alcohol outlets”;
- “reducing the amount of youth exposure to alcohol advertising”;
- “increasing the number of alcohol counter-ads”;
- “reduced numbers of alcohol billboards.”

These recommendations are to be expected. Everyone in the RWJF family of anti-alcohol warriors wants higher alcohol taxes. What makes Yoast’s paper remarkable is that the AMA lent its reputation to such a thorough denunciation of the adult beverage industry. Interestingly, the AMA’s own prize publication, *JAMA* (formerly *The Journal of the American Medical Association*), editorialized in 1994 that 80,000 deaths could be prevented every year by moderate drinking.

scare non-minorities and the middle class with the message that their alcohol-related problems are just as bad as anyone else’s. Through their kids, at their workplace, in their neighborhoods—the RWJF is attacking responsible drinkers.

- The RWJF claims “substance abuse problems in these inner-city sites turned out not to be dramatically worse than they were in the suburbs.” *Message to suburbanites: you think it’s bad in the inner city, but we’re telling you it’s just as bad in your own backyard.*
- The RWJF-funded workplace study notes: “Upper-level managers are more likely to drink during the workday than first-line supervisors or hourly workers are.” *Message to managers: a little scotch at the end of the day makes you a problem drinker.*
- A study of BAC laws, published by the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, argues: “The .08 law may be utilized more in the affluent suburbs than in the metropolitan or urban areas as the .08 and .09 cases were usually white-collar persons with no criminal background. Examination of this theory can be investigated by using drivers’ records and zip codes in the final report.” *Message to suburbanites: we’re coming after you.*

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Thanks mostly to the RWJF-funded Mothers Against Drunk Driving, the definition of “drunk” was changed in 2000. Now set at .08 BAC, a 120-pound woman can become “drunk” on only two glasses of wine.

A study from the notoriously unreliable National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA) concluded that “excessive” drinking accounts for 30 percent of the alcohol consumed in America. Anything over two drinks in a day was considered “excessive.”

In CASA’s parlance, 12 drinks during any one year makes you a “lifetime drinker”—and therefore “at risk.” And “at-risk amounts” are defined as “three to four drinks at one occasion.” A “binge” is five or more drinks on one occasion, and 20 percent of the adult population are “binge drinkers” because they “binged” once during the last month.

So a husband and wife who split a bottle of wine with dinner are considered “excessive” drinkers, and perhaps “at risk.” Add a gin and tonic before dinner and an after dinner drink and the couple are now both “binge” drinkers.

How did we get here? It’s the same way “don’t drive drunk” became “don’t drink and drive” and “impairment begins with the first drink.” Anti-alcohol forces, led by the RWJF, are redefining the culture of drinking. Behaviors once considered normal and mundane are now viewed by public health nannies as indicators of social and health problems requiring their enlightened intervention. Unfortunately, this attitude has begun to trickle down to the culture at large.

For example, Orange County, California includes the following directives in its server training program:

Limit consumption to no more than one drink per hour.

Four ounces of wine is one drink—much less than a typical glassful.

Marginalizing Drinkers

At times, Yoast can get a little hysterical in his criticism of the industry. He blusters: “Ads allegedly aired to reduce drunk driving are meaningless—except for the liquor logo prominently displayed at the conclusion, that’s the message.” He further complains: “Slogans such as ‘think when you drink’ and ‘know when to say when,’ which are frequently targeted to underage youth, assume the recipient is drinking and provide no information regarding safe levels of drinking. Studies show that most people cannot accurately assess their own intoxication—in other words, do not think when they drink and do not know when to stop.”

Yoast’s ravings reflect two central tenets of the RWJF game plan: Position alcohol as a drug that cannot be resisted by an individual’s own efforts, and therefore requires legal restrictions to save the individual from himself. Yoast goes to great lengths to argue that only a small proportion of the population drinks, claiming:

- “A small percentage of drinkers consume most of the alcohol sold.”
- “Most young people and adults drink very little or not at all.”
- “Only about 10 percent of the adult population consume moderate amounts (defined by the federal government as from one to two drinks per day), despite a popular belief that most Americans consume alcohol in moderation.”
- “Most people overestimate the levels of alcohol consumption in our society. As these data suggest, alcohol is not an important part of life for most Americans. Yet we generally concur with the alcohol industry’s common assertion that ‘the overwhelming majority of adults drink [alcohol] responsibly.’”

Believing he has demonstrated that drinking is “not an important part of life for most Americans,” Yoast goes on to argue that industry-fostered misperceptions of “drinking norms” lead to binge drinking on college campuses. More importantly, he complains that we “make alcohol use normal, convenient, and cheap in part because we believe this responds to the demands of most people. In fact, as noted above, most Americans drink very little or not at all.” In reality, 67 percent of adults drink at least once a year, according to the USDA. Presumably they think drinking should be “normal” and “convenient.” But Yoast is trying to separate

the 10 percent of Americans who he claims drink regularly from the nine out of ten who he claims do not, and then enlist this mythical 90 percent in the fight against “convenient and cheap” alcohol.

Alcohol is not “normal,” Yoast argues. Therefore, it should be restricted. “High profile community support plays a significant role in normalizing alcohol consumption,” he claims. Therefore, it should not receive community support.

Yoast goes on to detail how the alcohol industry employs the “four Ps” of marketing—Product, Price, Place, and Promotion—in its effort to “normalize” alcohol among underage drinkers:

Product “Sweet, fruity alcohol products popular with teenagers blur the line between alcohol and soft drinks.”

Promotion “Young people are bombarded with \$4 billion of alcohol marketing each year.”

Place “Alcohol is one of the most readily available consumer products, often sold in retail venues frequented by young people. Many communities are saturated with alcohol outlets, particularly in college and low-income areas.”

Price “Alcohol is cheap and becoming cheaper. The relative price of alcohol has been dropping steadily for the last five decades, in part due to the reduction of the real value of alcohol excise taxes, which have been eroded by inflation ... Young people are particularly sensitive to alcohol prices.”

The Anti-Alcohol Movement’s Four Ps

Attacking industry’s efforts to (horrors!) market its products falls somewhat flat when you consider that anti-alcohol forces market their own “product” in just the same way. Indeed, two RWJF-funded groups—the Marin Institute for the Prevention of Alcohol and Other Drug Problems and the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation—composed a paper describing how their movement could employ the “four P’s” to reduce per capita consumption. The report argues: “Each of the four P’s has a set of corresponding preventive responses. These responses

Cut off patrons after “two to four small drinks, depending on body size, gender and how long they’ve been sitting there.”

The Orange County Register helpfully suggests: “Restaurants and bar owners can make up some of the lost drinks through extra sales of food.”

Their purpose is to scare normal people away from drinking, to make them think that drinking is not normal, and (if all else fails), to make it more difficult and expensive for them to drink.

“Our culture is not for sale!” That’s the message of one major campaign in California to eliminate alcohol and alcohol sponsorship from *Cinco de Mayo* celebrations. Organizers successfully billed their efforts as “grassroots,” but the RWJF’s fingerprints were all over the project:

- It received support from the Center for Science in the Public Interest, the Marin Institute, the Trauma Foundation, and other RWJF-funded outfits.
- The Trauma Foundation evaluated the project.
- The project was presented as a case study at the RWJF-funded 2003 Alcohol Policy Conference.
- The campaign relied on research funded by the RWJF, particularly a paper from the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation on alcohol problems in the Latino community.
- Its spokesperson was a RWJF National Fellow in “Developing Leadership in Reducing Substance Abuse,” a designation that includes a cash award of \$25,000 per year for three years.
- Jim Gogek, another RWJF fellow covered the project for *The San Diego Tribune*.

Gogek mislabeled the project as a “fledgling grass-roots movement,” called industry donations to Hispanic organizations “blood money,” and accused manufacturers of a “carnage of alcohol.” He quoted a “professor of public health at Columbia University” who accused the alcohol industry of targeting youth and lying about its advertising. What he doesn’t say, however, is that the cited professor is also a program officer at the RWJF.

Anti-alcohol forces measured the success of “Our culture is not for sale!” not in a few dry *Cinco de Mayo* celebrations but in the positive press it generated for their movement, and in the negative publicity it brought down on the alcohol industry. Gogek was hardly the only columnist to accuse the industry of “targeting” Latinos and deliberately causing massive health problems.

should be coordinated with each other and applied in a comprehensive manner, targeting specific demographic groups. At stake is the shape of the alcohol environment and the level of risk to which a given population group is exposed.” The report also provides “a checklist of possible community policy options, using the four Ps typology.”

Place

1. *Restrict the location and number of commercial alcohol outlets.*
 - Prohibit alcohol outlets within specified distances from schools, child-care centers, youth centers, and other locations where children congregate.
 - Prohibit alcohol outlets from locating within specific distances of other alcohol outlets.
 - Restrict the total number of alcohol outlets based on a population ratio.
2. *Restrict the types of commercial alcohol outlets.*
 - Restrict or prohibit concurrent sales of alcohol and gasoline.
 - Restrict alcohol sales at mini-marts.
 - Prohibit alcohol sales in non-traditional outlets (e.g., laundromats, movie theaters, beauty salons).
 - Clearly distinguish between bars/nightclubs and restaurants (e.g., by limiting restaurants’ alcohol sales to a maximum of 40 percent of their receipts; restricting late hour operations; prohibiting separate bar areas), and permit bars only in “adult” zoned areas.
 - In restaurants, require that all alcohol sales be made only in conjunction with food service and sales.
3. *Require commercial alcohol outlets to use responsible serving/sales practices.*
 - Require good management policies and training to ensure that servers and clerks routinely and effectively check age identification.
 - Require a minimum age of 21 for all servers and clerks.
 - Prohibit employee alcohol consumption while on duty.
 - Prohibit minors’ access to bars and nightclubs.
 - Prohibit video games and other forms of entertainment popular with teenagers in alcohol establishments where minors can be present.
 - Limit the amount of square footage and shelf space dedicated to alcohol sales in retail outlets.
 - Restrict home delivery sales.
 - Restrict hours of sale.
 - Require adequate lighting to enable staff to discern easily

the appearance and conduct of persons in the outlet and adjacent areas.

- Prohibit all public nuisance activities in and around alcohol outlets, including loitering, littering, harassment of passers-by, graffiti, loud noise, violations of state ABC code provisions, and criminal conduct.
- Restrict or prohibit public telephones (to deter drug dealing).
- Require adequate security including, if warranted, the employment of a security guard.
- Conduct routine, effective compliance checks.

4. *Restrict minors' access to noncommercial sources of alcohol.*

- Restrict alcohol service at community events such as fairs and holiday celebrations.
- Create alcohol-safe community events.
- Restrict the availability of alcohol in public settings such as parks and recreation centers.
- Enact keg registration and teen party ordinances to reduce the availability of alcohol to young people in noncommercial settings.
- Enact teen party ordinances that hold adults accountable for hosting teen parties.

Promotion

- Prohibit outdoor advertising and billboards in areas where children are present (including residential zones and within 1,000 feet of schools, playgrounds and other child-oriented facilities).
- Restrict alcohol advertising to the interior of commercial alcohol outlets, and prohibit advertising inside the store that is visible from outside.
- Require signs prominently posted in commercial establishments regarding minimum age for alcohol purchase.
- Require signs prominently posted in public parks/facilities stating that it is illegal to consume alcoholic beverages.
- Prohibit the use of cartoon characters and other child-oriented images and slogans in alcohol advertising.
- Prohibit alcohol advertising by local retailers on television or radio programs with underage audiences exceeding 25 percent.
- Place limitations on the percentage of store window space devoted to advertising.
- Prohibit distribution or sale of any alcohol industry promotional materials to minors (e.g., as prizes at local fairs).
- Restrict alcohol industry sponsorship of any event sponsored or cosponsored by local government, any youth event (e.g., youth athletic events), or any event located on public property.

While the *Cinco de Mayo* campaign had a specific focus, its spillover effects were more significant. Organizers met with the Los Angeles County Commission on Alcohol; four days later, the Commission adopted a resolution urging the county to end alcohol sales and sponsorships at all public events and parks.

Jim Gogek

Jim Gogek, an editorial writer for the *San Diego Union-Tribune*, is paid \$25,000 per year by the RWJF. It's a good investment. On March 13, 2003, he penned an op-ed in the *New York Times* accusing the governors of California, New York, and Maryland of being bought and paid for by the alcohol industry because they oppose even steeper taxes on alcoholic beverages. Gogek claimed alcohol abuse costs society \$185 billion a year, and cited well-debunked numbers from the RWJF-funded National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse on youth drinking. He also claimed, incredibly, that "[b]inge drinking (five or more drinks at a time) accounts for 83 percent of all alcohol consumed." Where did that number come from?

Probably from a report issued by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and prepared by the RWJF-funded Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation. But that report actually said that "[b]inge drinkers are 20 percent of the population, but drink 83 percent of the alcohol." Notice the difference: "binge drinkers" vs. "binge drinking."

Millions of *New York Times* readers now think binge drinking "accounts for 83 percent of all alcohol consumed." Is Gogek stupid? Does he not understand that the 20 percent of Americans defined as "binge drinkers" don't always have more than five drinks? That "binge drinking" accounts for only a fraction of the alcohol consumed by so-called "binge drinkers"? Or is he purposely manipulating the data to exaggerate the problem?

Don't hold your breath for anyone in the RWJF family of alcohol warriors to step in and correct him.

These coalitions took the RWJF's money, used RWJF-funded research, received technical assistance from RWJF-funded organizations, and employed all the tools the RWJF has been developing over the years.

Product

- Require that 12-ounce or smaller containers of beer be sold in six-packs only: no single can sales (which encourage street drinking).
- Restrict the size of single beer containers to no more than one quart.
- Require that wine be sold in containers of at least 750 milliliters in volume or in minimum four-pack cooler containers.
- Permit corked wine containers only: prohibit screw top wine bottles.
- Prohibit sales of distilled spirits in mini-bottles unless sold in multiples.
- Prohibit/restrict sales of fortified wine and malt liquors (at least in residential areas) or specify that these products may not be chilled for sale.
- Prohibit sales of “alcopops” and other alcoholic products with characteristics that clearly appeal to youth (e.g., sweet taste; cartoon characters on packaging).

Price

- Impose fees on all commercial alcohol outlets to cover local code and law enforcement costs.
- Impose/increase alcohol taxes (if a local option is available), and encourage increased taxes at state and federal levels.
- Prohibit discounted alcohol prices that are lower than standard prices in the community.
- Prohibit price promotions, such as flat fee “drink and drown” nights.

What do the anti-alcohol movement’s four Ps have to do with the alcohol abuser? Nothing. Their purpose is to scare normal people away from drinking, to make them think that drinking is not normal, and (if all else fails), to make it more difficult and expensive for them to drink.

Fighting Back

A program called “Fighting Back” is the RWJF’s most ambitious effort to employ the 4Ps strategy. Fighting Back has spent nearly \$65 million to nurture anti-alcohol coalitions in 14 areas: Little Rock, Santa Barbara, Vallejo, New Haven, Worcester, Kansas City, Charlotte, San Antonio, Milwaukee, Newark, Washington, Oakland, Columbia, and northwest New Mexico. These coalitions took the RWJF’s money, used RWJF-funded research, received technical assistance from RWJF-funded organizations, and employed all the tools the RWJF has been developing over the years. Among other goals, they sought to:

- “prohibit consumption in public”;
- “oppose/close liquor outlets in risk-areas”;
- “ban liquor sales on Sunday”;
- “ban fortified wines/malt liquors in risk-areas”; and
- “increase the tax on alcohol.”

While Fighting Back scored minor successes like limiting beer sales at the New Mexico State Fair, its primary purpose was more ambitious. The RWJF said of its program: “What the social science field and the substance abuse field want to know is: *Is this a national strategy to tackle substance abuse?*” Anti-alcohol advocates, the RWJF continues, “are looking for something that should be heralded as *the solution*.” (emphases in the original)

The RWJF hoped Fighting Back would “achieve measurable reduction in the overall use of or demand for alcohol.” It did not. “The evaluation has shown that a sustained, 10-year community-based coalition approach with ample technical assistance and direction, top-notch people, and sites that were pre-selected, did not produce robust results.”

Nevertheless, the RWJF re-funded Fighting Back in San Antonio, New Haven, Vallejo, Kansas City, Santa Barbara, Washington, Milwaukee, Worcester, Columbia, Charlotte, Newark and New Mexico. Why? Because they’re still looking for the silver bullet and they think that programs like Fighting Back are part of it. “Community coalitions alone,” says the RWJF, “are *not a sufficient solution* to the substance abuse problem.” (emphasis in the original) But when community coalitions are combined with intensifying law enforcement efforts, particularly roadblocks, anti-alcohol advocates see more positive results.

In her Rand Corporation report, Deborah Cohen indicated that roadblocks, coupled with environmental restrictions on alcoholic beverages, would reduce per capita consumption. In addition, the RWJF’s community coalitions that emphasized roadblocks as part of the environmental approach yielded more robust results. The Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, which evaluated three cities that focused on roadblocks, “didn’t expect [the programs] to have an effect on reduction of heavy drinking.” It thought that reducing the availability of alcohol would diminish frequency of drinking, rather than the amount consumed per occasion. And indeed, the environmental approach—coupled with roadblocks—reduced drinking frequency.

Vallejo: A Case Study

The RWJF-funded “Fighting Back” program in Vallejo, California is celebrating its 15th year of restricting alcohol use. After the RWJF provided seed money for the project, both the federal and local governments kicked in significant cash—which is exactly what the RWJF was hoping for. Even with its large anti-alcohol budget, the RWJF knows it can’t fund every program. Instead, it seeks to be the trailblazer, to demonstrate the success of one or two local coalitions to the satisfaction of legislators, who can then use the public purse to replicate these anti-alcohol coalitions nationwide.

The Vallejo Fighting Back Partnership (FBP) has scored several legislative victories over the years. According to the FBP:

“A Conditional Use Permit filters new outlets by setting multiple restrictions, such as requiring 1000 feet between liquor outlets; and a Deemed-Approved Ordinance describes legal nonconforming use outlets as “Deemed-Approved,” legally permitting local authorities to apply performance standards to all 170 of Vallejo’s existing outlets. This ordinance, like similar ordinances passed in Oakland and Santa Cruz, gives ABC control to local authorities, allowing them to sanction, fine, or close outlets for non-compliance with new regulations ... Due to the success of these ordinances, some liquor outlets are either going out of business or expressing interest in changing their product base in an attempt to stay open.”

Actually, that understates FBP’s power. It effectively controls the Alcohol Policy Commission, whose recommendations to the city council are regularly rubber-stamped. As a result, more than one-third of proposed new venues were rejected. When one proposed gas-station/coffee-house was denied the right to sell alcohol, the developer threatened to pull out. But in the end, the project went through—without alcohol.

The language of these regulations is so broad (“It does not result in adverse

effects to the health, peace or safety of persons residing or working in the surrounding area”) that FBP can essentially close an outlet at will. Again, according to FBP, one liquor store owner:

“... agreed to reduce dependence on alcohol sales, particularly reducing the sale of malt liquor and fortified wines, and to devote more floor space to groceries and items the residents need. Residents also requested that the store reduce its hours of operation and the owner complied. The owner’s desire to cooperate with residents is reflected in a new name. Val’s Liquor Store has become Val’s Heritage Market. But the breakthrough collaborative process, Sparks is quick to note, only came after intense community pressure and a realization by the owner that new regulations would make it difficult to continue profiting off liquor sales.”

FBP also successfully lobbied to force both new and existing alcohol outlets to pay a fee “for which they will receive education” about these laws. Perhaps more importantly, FBP-inspired legislation mandates server training from FBP itself.

Another bill pushed through by the FBP, labeled as an attack on teen drinking parties, actually outlaws all gatherings where five or more minors are present and any one minor is drinking. Good thing a special clause allows gatherings “permitted by Article I, Section 4, of the California Constitution.” Otherwise, Sunday Mass would be illegal. And anyone violating those rules will be financially accountable should the city incur any resultant expenses. So a family reunion where 10 kids are present and a 20-year-old has a beer is illegal in Vallejo, and the owner of the house where it took place is financially responsible if that 20-year-old subsequently gets in a fender bender.

In February 2003, FBP worked with the Majority Leader of California’s State Assembly to introduce a bill that would require alcohol producers to pay a fee based on revenue earned from the illegal sale of alcohol to minors.

Vallejo is important because neo-prohibitionist activists in other locations cite it

The Pacific Institute’s lead evaluator noted that to achieve this reduction of drinking occasions, “You have to have somebody to teach how to mobilize and get groups together and get the different parts working together.” But once you have the model in place, “the approaches themselves are relatively inexpensive.”

Adding roadblocks to community coalitions using the environmental approach could be the RWJF’s new game plan. If that model successfully reduces per capita consumption, the RWJF will make it a “national strategy” and fund it everywhere. Implementing the national strategy—and making a serious dent in per capita consumption—will be the easy part.

Bringing It All Together

The RWJF helps amplify the real-world impact of the relatively small anti-alcohol movement by funding regular conferences where activists, researchers, and donors congregate to plan their next moves. Recent conferences have emphasized the environmental approach, the 4Ps, and the need for all RWJF-funded groups to collaborate.

The “Alcohol Policy XII” conference was organized by the RWJF-funded Marin Institute and held in June 2000. There, anti-alcohol advocates issued the following “key warnings and recommendations”:

On “place”...

- “Reduce concentration of alcohol outlets.”
- “Close bars earlier in the evening.”
- “Support zoning requirements that reduce alcohol problems in communities.”
- “Require responsible beverage service training.”
- “Restrict hours of operation.”
- “There is a high percentage of alcohol-related violence at sporting events—maybe there should be alcohol sale and use guidelines for new stadiums?”
- “Remember that people leave stadiums and airports drunk and get in their cars and drive home.”
- “There is a lack of restrictions regarding alcohol consumption in airports and while on board.”

- Require “consumers to complete a mandatory training on alcohol laws and responsible use when they turn 21.”
- “Collect data on drinking situations and environments (e.g., “location of last drink” data makes local retailers aware of their role in alcohol-related problems).”

On “promotion”...

- “Ban all alcohol ads in print, TV, radio, magazine (as we did with tobacco).”
- “Limit alcohol advertising on the national and local levels.”
- “Adequately fund a counter-advertising campaign.”
- “Limit or regulate visibility and use of alcohol, alcohol advertising, and alcohol promotion in public venues (i.e., regulate size of containers, sales time at public events, consider children and families).”

On “price” ...

- “Support an increase of the alcohol excise tax.”
- “Establish a national excise tax (levied in every state, or allow a local excise tax.)”

On strategy...

- “Encourage community coalitions to have the faith community collaborate with environmentally based prevention strategies.”
- “Mobilize union and professional organizations to provide lobbying around availability/licensing/taxation issues to reduce drinking.”

On roadblocks...

- “We want people to think, ‘If I drive drunk or impaired, I will get caught.’ Checkpoints are an effective tool to achieve this perception.”
- “Checkpoints should be one part of an overall strategy.”
- “Re-evaluate methods for measuring the effectiveness ratio of checkpoints. Use the number of people exposed to a police officer’s review as the denominator as opposed to number of arrests per stops made.”

as a model. At Alcohol Policy Conference XIII, one participant argued that the proposed California legislation would serve as an “example” that “will have tremendous power for our movement throughout the country.” Anti-alcohol legislation in one locality has a bandwagon effect. The basic argument is “They did. So should we.”

The RWJF used Vallejo and other Fighting Back coalitions as experimental laboratories. If those experiments are successful, they’ll repeat them. And it’s much harder to fight anti-alcohol forces when they have supposedly “successful” models to back them up.

“Reduce concentration of alcohol outlets... Restrict hours of operation... Support an increase of the alcohol excise tax...”

Oregon Partnership

The RWJF isn't just going after alcohol marketing in the mass media; it's also targeting a primary point of service—restaurants.

The Oregon Partnership, an anti-alcohol community organization funded primarily by the RWJF, is just one of hundreds of field units reporting back to the RWJF command center. They've written op-eds citing RWJF-funded research, received technical assistance from RWJF-funded outfits, and used messages honed by the RWJF. For example, the Oregon Partnership bought advertising space on the side of Portland city buses and ran the infamous beer-is-heroin ad.

How does the Oregon Partnership defend such an outrageous piece of propaganda? By saying “kids need clear and consistent messages.” *In other words, kids should get the message—clearly and consistently—that their parents are drug addicts.*

The Oregon Partnership pushes the typical RWJF agenda: a ban on alcohol in all sports facilities and increased taxes (a “‘damage deposit’ for the costs of alcohol consumption and addiction”). But its most successful (and telling) campaign concerned the Red Robin restaurant chain. In 1999, the Oregon Partnership attacked Red Robin for advertising “mocktails” (nonalcoholic versions of regular cocktails) in its restaurants. With 1998 sales exceeding \$300 million, the mocktail marketing campaign was the most profitable in Red Robin history, according to the company. The Oregon Partnership complained: “It's the Joe Camel concept, taken into the family restaurant to sell kids on alcohol.” And, “this is the most blatant form of marketing of alcohol to kids that we've seen.” The Oregon Partnership won its campaign, and persuaded local authorities to ban mocktail advertisements from Red Robin restaurants.

The most striking item on the list of recommendations demonstrated the RWJF's true sway over the anti-alcohol movement: “Research and data...should support the goals of the partnership/program funders.” In case any of the conference's participants had forgotten, the RWJF was paying their meal ticket. That's why anti-alcohol advocates always stay on message and never come out with contradictory analysis and programs. Deviation from the RWJF blueprint means no more funding. One more recommendation of note: “It is hard to get supporting data, so [policy makers] must be willing to accept ‘soft’ data.” Not only does the RWJF demand researchers' strict adherence to its agenda, but it also urges politicians to make policy decisions based on weak and inconclusive data. In other words, the RWJF wants what it wants, even if its own bought-and-paid-for research doesn't back up its orthodoxy.

“Alcohol Policy XIII” took place in March 2003. Participants wasted no time re-emphasizing the last meeting's priorities. “It is acceptable to take action before we have all the evidence,” one presenter said.

The director of the RWJF's anti-alcohol program stated: “We need to name individual brands and companies to bring about responsibility.” Echoing the responsibility point, another presenter reported that his studies show 75 percent approval for host liability laws. “We really have to look at restaurants, bars, and taverns...because most hazardous drinking occurs at bars,” he suggested.

Other participants argued:

- “If your ultimate objective is to reduce consumption...alcohol education doesn't seem to have made much of a difference...may not be directly related to our ultimate goal which is to reduce consumption.”
- “It is more effective to go after the people supplying [than consumers].”
- “Raising licensing fees and recycling them to enforcement is an option.”

And to great applause:

- “I think we ought to get rid of all of it [alcohol advertising].”

Researchers reviewed 32 different alcohol policies for “effectiveness” and presented their findings at Alcohol Policy XIII. They concluded that the most effective policies are:

- regulating physical availability;
- server liability; and
- taxation, which reportedly had “almost has a perfect score” in effectiveness.

Two of their least effective policies are those that target the actual abuser:

- education and persuasion: “It may have other beneficial affects but in terms of affecting drinking behavior and problems the evidence of effectiveness is equivocal.”
- treatment and intervention.

One presenter advocated a rationing system for alcohol and wanted to classify 15 to 29 year-olds as “youth.” His workshop was entitled: “Preventing alcohol problems: Popular approaches are ineffective, effective approaches are politically impossible.”

So it’s clear what the RWJF-funded anti-alcohol forces want. They want to somehow make the “effective approaches” that are now “politically impossible,” possible. One way to do that is by exaggerating the problems that alcohol consumption causes. If you can convince the public that the social consequences of alcohol abuse are a severe threat, then you can get away with “politically impossible” approaches.

The RWJF funds other get-togethers aside from the vast Alcohol Policy conferences. For example, a conference hosted by the Marin Institute in 2000 considered an international anti-alcohol agenda, and was funded in part by the World Health Organization. That event emphasized the extent of the problems associated with alcohol consumption. Its closing statement read: “Alcohol’s contribution to global disease and disability exceeds that of tobacco, and its contribution to disability outstrips both malnutrition and occupational hazards.” Participants also “called for the creation of a global network for alcohol policy, an organization that would advocate for policies at the country and international levels to reduce the harm that can be done by alcohol. [The organization would] research and monitor the activities of multinational alcohol companies and the effects of international trade agreements on alcohol-related harm.”

“Research and data...should support the goals of the partnership/program funders.”

The Anti-Alcohol Movement's Game Plan

The RWJF-funded anti-alcohol movement seeks to convince the public of the following propositions:

- The social consequences of alcohol consumption are immense, and require drastic action.
- The vast majority of Americans either abuse alcohol or don't drink it. The former shouldn't have access to alcohol, and the latter won't care if you take it away.
- Responsible drinking is an oxymoron.
- Drinking is not normal, it is not acceptable, and it should be isolated from mainstream culture.
- Adult drinking encourages kids to engage in reckless behavior.
- The alcohol industry "targets" children, abusers, and minorities with "deceptive" advertising.
- Alcohol advertising leads inexorably to abuse.
- Convenient, inexpensive alcohol leads inevitably to its abuse.
- There is no such thing as responsible drinking and driving.

*Responsible drinking
is an oxymoron.*

The more the public hears these messages, the more they will tolerate the legislation and regulation of the "environmental approach." Billboards have been taken down, hours of service have been slashed, roadblocks have been thrown up, legal BAC levels have come down, taxes have been raised, ads in restaurants have been eliminated. It's only the beginning.

Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Programs

Fighting Back: Community Initiatives to Reduce Demand for Illegal Drugs and Alcohol

Total outlays since 1988: \$64,941,902

The “Fighting Back” program is directed by David Rosenbloom, Executive Director of “Join Together” (the brainchild of Ralph Hingson) at Boston University’s School of Public Health. Since 1991, the RWJF has granted \$38,567,529 to Boston University for alcohol-related programs (\$4,172,153 for administration of the Fighting Back program and \$33,641,683 for the Join Together program.). Presently, there are five active Fighting Back coalitions:

Kansas City, MO – Move Up, Inc., Fighting Back
New Haven, CT – New Haven Fighting Back
San Antonio, TX – San Antonio Fighting Back of the United Way
Santa Barbara, CA – Santa Barbara Fighting Back
Vallejo, CA – Vallejo Fighting Back Partnership, Inc.

A Matter of Degree: Reducing High-Risk Drinking Among College Students

Total outlays since 1995: \$20,410,757

“A Matter of Degree,” one of two programs funded by the RWJF and administered by the American Medical Association, sponsors anti-alcohol “environmental approach” initiatives at 10 university campuses:

Florida State University – Tallahassee, Florida
Georgia Institute of Technology – Atlanta, Georgia
Lehigh University – Bethlehem, Pennsylvania
Louisiana State University – Baton Rouge, Louisiana
University of Colorado – Boulder, Colorado
University of Delaware – Newark, Delaware
University of Iowa – Iowa City, Iowa
University of Nebraska at Lincoln – Lincoln, Nebraska
University of Vermont – Burlington, Vermont
University of Wisconsin – Madison, Wisconsin

Richard Yoast directs the program from his perch at the AMA’s Office of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse, which has received \$5,857,500 from the RWJF since 1995. From the website of “A Matter of Degree”:

Rather than blame students for their behavior or try to persuade them to stop drinking, participants in A Matter of Degree are identi-

fying the environmental factors such as alcohol advertising and marketing, institutional policies and practices, local ordinances—even social and cultural beliefs and behaviors... coalitions may seek to curb the practice of alcohol discounting, such as two-for-one drink specials, inexpensive beer pitcher sales, and other promotions in their communities that encourage excessive drinking. Or perhaps they will work to limit alcohol-industry sponsorship of social events, including sports, concerts and ethnic celebrations.

Reducing Underage Drinking Through Coalitions

Total outlays since 1996: over \$29 million

Each of the following local anti-alcohol coalitions receives at least \$200,000 a year through “Reducing Underage Drinking Through Coalitions”:

The Connecticut Coalition to Stop Underage Drinking
The Georgia Alcohol Policy Partnership
The Indiana Coalition to Reduce Underage Drinking
The Louisiana Alliance to Prevent Underage Drinking
The Minnesota Join Together Coalition to Reduce Underage Alcohol Use
Missouri’s Youth/Adult Alliance Against Underage Drinking
The National Capital Coalition to Prevent Underage Drinking
The North Carolina Initiative to Reduce Underage Drinking
The Oregon Coalition to Reduce Underage Drinking
Pennsylvanians Against Underage Drinking
The Puerto Rico Coalition to Reduce Underage Drinking
Texans Standing Tall, A Statewide Coalition to Reduce Underage Drinking

Reducing Underage Drinking Through Coalitions has also doled out:

- \$3,513,250 to the AMA for administration
- \$3,122,268 to MADD
- \$1,112,638 to the Oregon Partnership
- \$1,640,143 to the Indiana Coalition to Reduce Underage Drinking, a group lobbying for a 50 percent increase in the state’s alcohol tax

Substance Abuse Policy Research Program

Total outlays since 1995: over \$20 million

The Substance Abuse Policy Research Program supports research projects, including:

- \$263,711 for Deborah Cohen’s “Population Consumption Model”
- \$347,882 for the Pacific Institute for Research and Development’s “Implications of Tobacco Litigation for Alcohol Policy.”

Developing Leadership in Reducing Substance Abuse

The “Developing Leadership” program pairs young anti-alcohol activists with seasoned neo-prohibitionists in a mentor-student relationship. The young participants—who often work at RWJF-funded programs and organizations—receive \$25,000 a year for three years. Recipients include Jim Gogek and Jeff Servinski.

Innovators Combating Substance Abuse

This is the RWJF’s version of the MacArthur Genius Awards. Each Innovator receives \$300,000 for future research. Recipients include Ralph Hingson and Alexander C. Wagenaar.

Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Organizations

Center on Alcohol Marketing to Youth (CAMY)

Grants received 2002: \$5,000,000

CAMY issues high-profile reports on alcohol advertising that “targets” children. Half its funding comes from the RWJF.

Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI)

Grants received 1996-2002: \$1,209,925

CSPI runs the Coalition for the Prevention of Alcohol Problems, a group comprised of more than 100 anti-alcohol groups, that focuses on lobbying Congress to achieve three goals:

- 1) Mandate health warnings on all alcohol advertising
- 2) “Increas[e] excise taxes to reduce overall consumption”
- 3) Implement a government-funded media campaign to reduce underage drinking

Education Development Center (EDC)

Grants received 1996-2002: \$6,898,506

The RWJF called on EDC to organize Alcohol Policy Conference XIII, and to create “the content for online communications resources for grantees of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. These resources, which will be part of the Foundation’s Web site, will offer grantees models for developing press releases, annual reports, newsletters, public service announcements, and other communications tools commonly used to advance program goals.”

Join Together Online (JTO)

Grants Received: 1991-2002: \$33,641,683

Run through Boston University’s School of Public Health, Join Together Online acts as the central repository for neo-prohibitionist news and research on the Internet. The brainchild of Ralph Hingson, Join Together describes itself as “primarily funded” by the RWJF.

Marin Institute

Total grants received 1993-2002: \$586,510

The Marin Institute provides technical support to RWJF community programs. Advocates of the environmental approach, the Marin Institute has actively opposed health-related wine labels, “the glut of alcohol outlets in low-income communities,” and favors “eliminating prizes featuring alcohol advertising from children’s games.” The Marin Institute also evaluates the efforts of local coalitions, and acts and as “watchdogs of alcohol marketing practices”—going so far as to file an Anheuser-Busch shareholder resolution “to eliminate advertising images that appeal to children.”

Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD)

Grants received 1996-2001: \$3,391,268

MADD’s activities have less and less to do with road safety. MADD supports increased alcohol taxes and the “environmental approach.”

National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA)

Grants Received 1991-2001: \$33,298,213

The RWJF is by far the largest contributor to this “research” institution, run by former Carter Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary Joseph Califano. CASA is best known for publicizing statistics on alcohol abuse that haven’t been peer-reviewed and “prove to be wrong,” in the words of the *The New York Times*.

Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation (PIRE)

Total Grants received 1996-present: at least \$347,375

PIRE runs two research centers: the Prevention Research Center in Berkeley, CA and the Public Services Research Institute in Calverton, MD. PIRE has called for random roadside breath tests to cover at least half the driving population each year. That’s nearly eight million drivers pulled over by the police each week without cause. James Fell, James Mosher, and Robert Voas work at PIRE.

Partnership for Prevention

Total outlays since 1996: \$2,926,027

The Partnership for Prevention hosts the Congressional Prevention Coalition (CPC), a group comprised of 21 Senators and 52 Congressmen as of the 107th Congress, that aims to “raise the level of knowledge in the Congress about public health concerns”—including alcohol beverage issues. The Partnership for Prevention seeks to:

- Increase the federal tax on alcoholic beverages.

- Eliminate the tax deduction for the advertising costs of alcohol.
- Ban alcohol advertisements on television.
- Ban alcohol advertising within a specified distance of educational institutions, including college campuses.
- Require stronger notices on alcohol products and advertisements, e.g. alcohol impairs judgment for driving.
- Establish a federal minimum age of 21 for sellers of alcohol.
- Require states to eliminate alcohol advertising billboards as a condition of receiving federal highway funds.
- Direct the Federal Communications Commission to restrict alcohol advertising during the hours when children are most likely to be watching television.
- Launch a public awareness campaign to highlight the risks of heavy alcohol consumption.

Trauma Foundation

Total Grants received 1997-2002: \$1,536,863

The Trauma Foundation runs multiple programs which aim to “reduce the availability of alcohol.” It “supports an increase in the price of beer; supports a limit on alcohol advertising and promotions that target people under twenty-one years of age, either incidentally or intentionally; and aims to limit alcohol outlet density by promoting local control of alcohol outlets and distribution.”

Robert Wood Johnson Foundation People

Joseph Califano

Califano is chairman and president of the RWJF-funded National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University (CASA); former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare under President Carter; and former chief domestic policy advisor to President Johnson. CASA has been widely criticized for publishing reports with questionable statistics.

Victor Capoccia

Victor Capoccia is the senior program officer of the RWJF's "Alcohol and Illegal Drugs Team." He once told the *Boston Globe*: "You can't expect to change teen-age use without first changing adult behaviors and norms."

Deborah Cohen

A Rand Corporation academic, Cohen has conducted several marquee anti-alcohol studies with grants from the RWJF. In her infamous "Population Consumption Model" paper she wrote:

Alcohol consumption by any individual is, in part, a function of the overall distribution of consumption of the community and leads to the conclusion that [the] magnitude of alcohol-related health problems in a population is directly related to per capita consumption. Individual consumption in turn is associated with various factors affecting the physical and social availability of the product within the community in which individuals reside.

Johnnetta Davis

Johnnetta Davis is the coordinator of PIRE's Center for Enforcing Underage Drinking Laws and the Director of Training and Technical Support. She was the deputy director of Reducing Underage Drinking Through Coalitions.

James Fell

James Fell was a principal cheerleader in the battle to lower legal blood alcohol limits to .08. Fell spent over 20 years at the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA). After leaving government, he became a board member of MADD and an employee of PIRE.

Jim Gogek

Gogek is an editorial writer for the *San Diego Union-Tribune*, and a Developing Leadership in Reducing Substance Abuse fellow. He has published numerous editorials critical of the alcohol industry, including a March 13, 2003 op-ed in *The New York Times* calling for higher taxes on alcohol.

George Hacker

Hacker heads the Center for Science in the Public Interest's (CSPI) Alcohol Policy Project. He chairs the Coalition for the Prevention of Alcohol Problems, an organization that conducts anti-alcohol lobbying on the federal level.

Wendy Hamilton

Wendy Hamilton is the president of MADD.

Ralph Hingson

Hingson chairs the Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences and serves as associate dean for Research at Boston University, posts from which he has published over 50 manuscripts attacking alcohol consumption. Hingson's published studies on the effects of .08 legislation are taken as gospel by anti-alcohol activists—especially at MADD, where he sits on the board. Hingson is also the senior advisor to Join Together Online (JTO), a web-based project that is primarily funded by the RWJF. In 2001, the RWJF gave Hingson a \$300,000 “Innovators Combating Substance Abuse” award.

David Jernigan

David Jernigan is the research director of the Center on Alcohol Marketing and Youth at Georgetown. He co-founded and was associate director of the Marin Institute, and is a member of the WHO Director-General's Alcohol Policy Strategy Advisory Committee. He was the principal author of the World Health Organization's recent “Global Status Report on Alcohol,” and has written several other papers for WHO.

James Mosher

James Mosher, the former associate director for Alcohol Policy for the Trauma Foundation, is currently on the staff of PIRE. He is an advisor to the Center on Alcohol Marketing and Youth. According to Mosher, “communities are awash with alcohol, and there is a set of norms and policies that put people at risk and make problems among youth inevitable.”

Dwayne Proctor

Dwayne Proctor is the senior communications officer of the RWJF's “Alcohol and Illegal Drugs Team.” The RWJF's website boasts that Proctor's “portfolio” includes work for the Partnership for a Drug Free America, the Center for Alcohol Marketing & Youth, the PRISM Awards, and the Leadership to Keep Children Alcohol Free.

Jeff Servinski

Jeff Servinski is the director of Training Programs at FACE—Truth and Clarity on Alcohol and a recipient of the “Developing Leadership to Reduce Substance Abuse” award from the RWJF.

Michael Sparks

Michael Sparks is the director of the Vallejo Fighting Back Partnership and associate director of Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s “Free to Grow Program.” He was also the co-founder and first Executive Director of the Marin Institute.

Robert Voas

A former board member of MADD, Voas now hangs his hat at PIRE. A BAC warrior, Voas said that drivers just above .08% BAC “often do not exhibit blatant erratic driving of higher BAC offenders, so the evidence of probable cause may not be present for stopping a vehicle.” He therefore concludes that roadblocks are essential for catching these drivers.

Alexander Wagenaar

Alexander Wagenaar is a public health professor at the University of Minnesota, a co-director of the ImpacTeen Alcohol Research Team, the principle evaluator of Reducing Underage Drinking Through Coalitions program, and a recipient of RWJF’s “Innovators Combating Substance Abuse” \$300,000 award.

Henry Wechsler

Wechsler runs the Harvard School of Public Health Alcohol Studies Program, which has received close to \$3 million for the evaluation of “A Matter of Degree.” In 2002, Wechsler released a RWJF-funded, headline-grabbing survey that claimed “44 percent of students on college campuses can be classified as binge drinkers.”

Richard Yoast

Yoast serves as the program director for A Matter of Degree and Reducing Underage Drinking Through Coalitions. He is the coordinator of AMA’s alcohol research and policy.